This database was created in and has been developed and curated by Barbara Flueckiger , professor at the Department of Film Studies, University of Zurich to provide comprehensive information about historical film color processes invented since the end of the 19th century including specific still photography color technologies that were their conceptual predecessors. In the University of Zurich and the Swiss National Science Foundation awarded additional funding for the elaboration of this web resource. In addition, the Institute for the Performing Arts and Film, Zurich University of the Arts provided a major contribution to the development of the database. Many further persons and institutions have supported the project, see acknowledgements. All the members of the two research projects on film colors, both led by Barbara Flueckiger, have been capturing photographs of historical film prints since
He described for us the topography of the land and the disposition of the two armies. It may soon be only a memory — for the prints are fading fast. So it is with color in film. In fact, MGM has, in Cocaine hotel peru news bust collasos years, done very well financially with theatrical reissues of its films, organized into retrospectives that feature a wide variety of titles from the MGM library. In this sense, the never-ending failure of drug prohibition is a huge success; of course, not in reaching Cocaine hotel peru news bust collasos declared goals, but in allowing a great number of opportunities to make money, to control territories, to intervene on social dynamics, and to continually press foreign countries to arrest, control, and kill people belonging to certain social, ethnic, or national groups. Eventually the tunnel was discovered, so Chapo shifted tactics once again, this time by going into the chili-pepper business. Columbia knew how much we wanted to get it done, which was part of their power. The constitutional provision that established the Department of Public Health Departamento de Salubridad was the same in which Haper teen fan lit central government was given the responsibility to control the movement of people both inside the country and those leaving Mexico, as well as the regulation of foreigners. While Angela sings of love in the nightclub of A Woman Is A Womana revolving colored spotlight casts first blue, then red light on her face.
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One slipped and fell off a precipice in the confusion of an armed robbery. Sociologist and drug war analyst Jaime Antezana said cocaine backpackers are targeted by law enforcement because powerful traffickers evade prosecution and capture by bribing police, prosecutors and judges. One backpacker described how his group would then get fed at a house in the Apurimac valley town of Lechemayo, issued backpacks and driven buzt high as the dirt road went. A hardy lot, cocaine backpackers are mostly collass Quechua speakers like Borda and hail pperu the isolated peasant co,lasos that suffered the worst atrocities of Peru's dirty war Amsterdam bdsm stories Shining Path rebels. While he has said he will crack down on cocaine production, he appears to be swimming against the current. Three individuals were arrested in connection with the discovery, including the head of the fruit and vegetable importer that had ordered the consignment. The scene here is peaceful; there seems no fear that anyone will be caught. Under the administration of Alan Garciathat went up to 10, hectares. Nevertheless, Peruvians have voiced discontent with government eradication of their source of Cocaine hotel peru news bust collasos. But while the drug crops have been reduced, this has come at immense costs.
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Bia Labate. Clancy Cavnar. Thiago Rodrigues. Veronica Zubillaga. Thomas Grisaffi. Aldo F. Rodrigo Uprimny. Andres Antillano. Guille Garat. Diana Rossi. Steve Rolles. Ana Jacome. Amanda Feilding. Jahlani Niaah. Alejandro Corda. Juan Ochoa. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The book also fills a void in the literature, as scant academic work has been published in recent years on drug policy in the region.
To my knowledge, it is also the first book in English to focus on both the evolution of the drug policy debate and the reform processes underway in some Latin American and Caribbean countries. The regional debate has spilled onto the world stage. In short, Latin America is at the vanguard of the international drug policy debate.
How it got there is due to a convergence of factors. The US government has long flexed its political, military, and economic muscle to dictate regional—if not global—drug policies, with a particularly strong impact on countries of historic US domination and those dependent on US economic support Central America and the Andes. Even today, the Associated Press reports that an estimated 4, US troops are on the ground and agents from at least 10 US agencies are involved in drug control efforts across Latin America.
Yet, for the most part, Washington is no longer calling the shots when it comes to national and regional drug policies. With four US states having implemented or in the process of implementing legal, regulated cannabis markets, the United States is now clearly out of compliance with the very interna- tional drug control conventions that it so carefully crafted.
Another factor spurring the debate is that some countries—most notably, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Ecuador—have been willing to experiment with innovative, if not radical, reforms. Boldly challenging the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Bolivia is the first country to denounce and return to the convention with a reservation allowing for licit coca use in that country. After several years of internal debate, Ecuador ultimately implemented a sweep- ing penal code reform that creates far greater proportionality in sentencing for drug offenses and attempts to clearly distinguish between consumers and traffickers.
As a result, between August , when the new penal code went into effect, and March , more than people convicted on drug offenses were released from prison. The new Ecuadorian penal code provides a model for other countries seeking to reduce the incarceration rates of low-level drug offenders.
Finally, a fundamental factor driving the regional drug policy debate is the high cost paid by Latin American countries for implementing policies dictated, at least initially, by Washington. Drug trafficking routes that used to be confined to strategic corridors now proliferate across the region, crisscrossing in every direction. With them come organized crime, corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions. And, as the drug trade has expanded, so have drug markets and problematic drug use in countries with scant resources to invest in health care, let alone drug treatment programs.
Excessively harsh sentencing policies, the adoption of mandatory minimums, and the expansion of conducts considered to be drug crimes have led to an explosion of people in jail on low-level drug offenses. As documented by the Collective for the Study of Drugs and the Law Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho, CEDD , in many countries, the penalties for committing any drug-related crime are higher than for rape or murder.
In Ecuador, prior to the adoption of its new penal code, the mandatory sentence for drug crimes was 12—25 years, while the maximum sentence for killing someone was 16 years. Hence, it was not uncommon to find low-level drug traffickers incarcerated with longer sentences than murderers. Numerous chapters of the book document how it is the most vulnerable sectors of society that bear the brunt of the punitive approach to drug control, in other words, how drug laws and policies contribute to the criminalization of poverty.
In Brazil, the possession of drugs for personal use was de-penalized, but police have the discre- tion to determine whether possession is for personal use or sale. Application of the law has taken on a distinctly racial tone, as White people are far more likely to be charged with possession than people of color.
Similarly, Grisaffi describes how coca eradication impacts poor farmers, driving them deeper into poverty and generating human rights violations and social conflict.
These policies have also come at another high cost: the resources that could have been invested in economic development in poor urban and rural communities, in health care, in evidence-based treatment programs, and the like.
US-backed drug policies have also sometimes worked at cross-purposes, aiding the very forces that are the alleged targets of the Drug War. One of the most interesting examples provided in the book is the case of Mexico, where Benjamin T. Smith explains how two parallel drug policies functioned side by side. On the one hand, there was the hard-line approach based on the international drug treaties and collaboration with the US government.
As in Latin America, the primary factor driving the significant increase in the number of both state and federal prisoners is harsh sentencing policies for drug-related crimes, in particular mandatory minimums. Why the US government remains wedded to policies that have failed is one of the harder questions to answer, as the present US drug policy in so many ways defies logic. Steve Rolles does a good job of addressing the question in his chapter on the United States. Similarly, in their introductory chapter, Thiago Rodrigues and Beatriz Labate provide an interesting view on how multiple and interconnected factors are the driving forces behind prohibition, including moral and social views and public security and international security concerns.
Yet, the US drug policy is on a slow path to reform. In response to the cannabis legalization efforts at the state level, the administration has responded cautiously, announcing that it would not intervene in the implementation of legal, regulated cannabis markets, while laying out a series of conditions which, if not met, could result in federal action.
Where President Obama has spoken out most forcefully is on the need to end mass incarceration in the United States. While significant reductions in the US prison population ultimately depend on the US Congress enacting legislative reforms, the US Department of Justice has implemented numerous regulatory changes that could reduce the number of federal prisoners.
As a result, for the first time since , the US federal prison population declined between and Reforms are progressing slowly in Latin America as well. This is particularly true in the case of the three countries that have led the push for broadening the debate at the international level: Guatemala, Colombia, and Mexico.
In the case of Colombia, a new drug law was drafted that could result in significant reforms, but officials from that country have made clear that no such reforms will be implemented until peace negotiations with the FARC guer- rillas have concluded.
One accord already reached in those negotiations would result in a shift from forced eradication to a focus on economic development in some coca and poppy growing regions of the country that, if implemented, would mark a dramatic departure from past policies. Finally, in the case of Mexico, a clear disconnect exists between the positions advocated by Mexican officials on the international stage and policy change domestically.
While local analysts and activists lament the lack of a domestic drug policy reform agenda, Mexico is playing an extremely significant role in pushing for a wide-ranging, inclusive, and transparent debate at the UNGASS on drugs, to take place in Ironically, some of the countries most opposed to having that debate are among the more left-wing governments in the region. Venezuela, along with Nicaragua and Cuba, which are not included in the book, tends to most vociferously defend the status quo; indeed, today they behave far more like drug warriors than the United States.
The chapter on Venezuela provides a compelling explanation of why the Chavez and now Maduro governments have challenged US hegemony in the region, while at the same time continuing to wage its Drug War. In short, despite the drug policy debate underway across the hemisphere and its international implications, Latin American and the Caribbean countries remain divided on the way forward.
Moreover, for the most part, public opinion strongly favors mano dura or hard-line approaches. Though the link between drugs and crime is not clearly established in many cases, as discussed in the Venezuela chapter, popular perceptions tend to equate drug policy reforms with increased drug use and crime.
In contrast to the United States, where cannabis legalization efforts are being driven by popular support at the state level, the Uruguayan government implemented its legalization effort despite public opinion, which has remained opposed to the initiative. An innovative educational campaign carried out by local NGOs at the time the legislation was being debated in congress only moved public opinion by a few percentage points; however, it was successful in improving the quality of the debate and bringing key civil society sectors on board.
This book is a must-read for anyone interested in one of the most cutting-edge debates in the hemisphere today. It provides an in-depth review of the history of the Drug War in key Latin American countries, a sound critique of the way those policies have been designed and implemented, and the costs that have been incurred by countries across the region as a result.
The authors offer a review of the debates presently underway and the reforms being implemented. While clearly laying out the realities in each of the countries presented, including obstacles and challenges to reform efforts, a cautious optimism seeps through.
Perhaps the so-called War on Drugs—a war waged on some of the most marginalized and vulnerable sectors of society—is finally coming to an end. We can only hope that more humane and effective policies will take its place. Coletta A. Kennedy University. She currently works at a dual diagnosis residential drug treatment center in San Francisco and is a research associate of the Nucleus for Interdisciplinary Studies of Psychoactives NEIP.
She combines an eclectic array of interests and activities as clinical psychologist, artist, and researcher. Her art is inspired by her experience with psychedelics, especially with the Santo Daime religious tradition.
She is author and co-author of articles in the Journal of Psychoactive Drugs and the International Journal for Drug Policy, among others. Her main areas of interest are the study of psychoactive substances, drug policy, shamanism, ritual, and religion.
She is author, co-author, and co-editor of 13 books, one special-edition journal, and several peer-reviewed articles. His fields of interest are: drug trafficking and security; Latin American security; non-state actors and global security; and post-structuralist international relations IR theory. He is a social psychologist and criminologist. His research focuses on crime transformations and on the penal field. He has published several papers and book chapters about security, drugs, and policing.
For more than a decade Professor Antillano has combined academia with public advocacy in the domain of police reform; social violence, specifically engaged in arms control and disarmament policy. He is a researcher engaged in the domain of human and social rights and vulnerable populations.
It is a big business. The Human Side By Capt. Peru has some inherent weaknesses that also make it vulnerable to wholesale macro-economic shifts of the type that have made it the number one producer of cocaine in the world again. They must now serve the minimum: Eight years. Next to the CD case are two straws and two little black packets. Post to Facebook. Some of these visitors from multiple countries end up leaving with more than souvenirs.
Cocaine hotel peru news bust collasos. Categories
Did you know that you can shorten your long urls with Shortest and get cash from every visitor to your short urls. My Web. Kikuo Johnson. Illustrations by Steve McNiven. Coloring by R. One afternoon last August, at a hospital on the outskirts of Los Angeles, a former beauty queen named Emma Coronel gave birth to a pair of heiresses.
The twins, who were delivered at and , respectively, stand to inherit some share of a fortune that Forbes estimates is worth a billion dollars. But his bride is a U. So authorities could only watch as she bundled up her daughters and slipped back across the border to introduce them to their dad.
He is a quasi-mythical figure in Mexico, the subject of countless ballads, who has outlived enemies and accomplices alike, defying the implicit bargain of a life in the drug trade: that careers are glittering but brief and always terminate in prison or the grave. In fact, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration, Chapo sells more drugs today than Escobar did at the height of his career. Alone among the Mexican cartels, Sinaloa is both diversified and vertically integrated, producing and exporting marijuana, heroin and methamphetamine as well.
That range alone should give you pause. Still, even if you take the lowest available numbers, Sinaloa emerges as a titanic player in the global black market. The drug war in Mexico has claimed more than 50, lives since But what tends to get lost amid coverage of this epic bloodletting is just how effective the drug business has become.
A close study of the Sinaloa cartel, based on thousands of pages of trial records and dozens of interviews with convicted drug traffickers and current and former officials in Mexico and the United States, reveals an operation that is global it is active in more than a dozen countries yet also very nimble and, above all, staggeringly complex.
And after prevailing in some recent mass-casualty clashes, it now controls more territory along the border than ever. From the remote mountain redoubt where he is believed to be hiding, surrounded at all times by a battery of gunmen, Chapo oversees a logistical network that is as sophisticated, in some ways, as that of Amazon or U.
As a mirror image of a legal commodities business, the Sinaloa cartel brings to mind that old line about Ginger Rogers doing all the same moves as Fred Astaire, only backward and in heels. In its longevity, profitability and scope, it might be the most successful criminal enterprise in history. Chapo was born in a village called La Tuna, in the foothills of the Sierra, in His formal education ended in third grade, and as an adult, he has reportedly struggled to read and write, prevailing upon a ghostwriter, at one point, to compose letters to his mistress.
For decades, Mexican smugglers had exported homegrown marijuana and heroin to the United States. But as the Colombian cocaine boom gathered momentum in the s and U.
Eventually, he caught a commercial flight back to Mexico, and shortly thereafter, he was summoned to a meeting with Chapo, who was by then an underboss in the cartel. With the decline of the Caribbean route, the Colombians started paying Mexican smugglers not in cash but in cocaine. More than any other factor, it was this transition that realigned the power dynamics along the narcotics supply chain in the Americas, because it allowed the Mexicans to stop serving as logistical middlemen and invest in their own drugs instead.
Not five years later, he was marshaling hundreds of flights laden with cocaine for Chapo. The young pilot became a gatekeeper to the ascendant kingpin, fielding his phone calls and accompanying him on foreign trips.
He and Chapo — Fatty and Shorty — made quite a pair. But by , it was moving three tons of cocaine each month over the border, and from there, to Los Angeles. The Sinaloa has always distinguished itself by the eclectic means it uses to transport drugs. Working with Colombian suppliers, cartel operatives moved cocaine into Mexico in small private aircraft and in baggage smuggled on commercial flights and eventually on their own s, which they could load with as much as 13 tons of cocaine.
They used container ships and fishing vessels and go-fast boats and submarines — crude semi-submersibles at first, then fully submersible subs, conceived by engineers and constructed under the canopy of the Amazon, then floated downriver in pieces and assembled at the coastline. These vessels can cost more than a million dollars, but to the smugglers, they are effectively disposable.
In the event of an interception by the Coast Guard, someone onboard pulls a lever that floods the interior so that the evidence sinks; only the crew is left bobbing in the water, waiting to be picked up by the authorities. Moving cocaine is a capital-intensive business, but the cartel subsidizes these investments with a ready source of easy income: marijuana. So marijuana tends to cross the border far from official ports of entry.
The cartel makes sandbag bridges to ford the Colorado River and sends buggies loaded with weed bouncing over the Imperial Sand Dunes into California. Michael Braun, the former chief of operations for the D. Grow it here. According to the D. National Forest land to supply the market in Chicago. He personally negotiates shipments to the United States and stands by its quality, which is normally 94 percent pure. But the future of the business may be methamphetamine. During the s, when the market for meth exploded in the United States, new regulations made it more difficult to manufacture large quantities of the drug in this country.
This presented an opportunity that the Sinaloa quickly exploited. Here was a drug that was ragingly addictive and could be produced cheaply and smuggled with relative ease. When they first started manufacturing meth, the Sinaloa would provide free samples to their existing wholesale clients in the Midwest.
They wanted the market. To grasp the scale of production, consider the volume of some recent precursor seizures at these ports: 22 tons in October ; 88 tons in May ; tons last December.
When Mexico banned the importation of ephedrine, the cartel adapted, tweaking its recipe to use unregulated precursors. Recently they have started outsourcing production to new labs in Guatemala. In the late s, Chapo hired an architect to design an underground passageway from Mexico to the United States. What appeared to be a water faucet outside the home of a cartel attorney in the border town of Agua Prieta was in fact a secret lever that, when twisted, activated a hydraulic system that opened a hidden trapdoor underneath a pool table inside the house.
The passage ran more than feet, directly beneath the fortifications along the border, and emerged inside a warehouse the cartel owned in Douglas, Ariz. As the deliveries multiplied, Sinaloa acquired a reputation for the miraculous speed with which it could push inventory across the border.
Eventually the tunnel was discovered, so Chapo shifted tactics once again, this time by going into the chili-pepper business. He sent drugs in the refrigeration units of tractor-trailers, in custom-made cavities in the bodies of cars and in truckloads of fish which inspectors at a sweltering checkpoint might not want to detain for long.
He sent drugs across the border on freight trains, to cartel warehouses in Los Angeles and Chicago, where rail spurs let the cars roll directly inside to unload. He sent drugs via FedEx. They are often ventilated and air-conditioned, and some feature trolley lines stretching up to a half-mile to accommodate the tonnage in transit. But in reality, blue-chip traffickers tend to fixate, with neurotic intensity, on the concept of risk.
Now in his 60s and a grandfather, El Mayo has been in the drug business for nearly half a century and has amassed a fortune. Smugglers often negotiate, in actuarial detail, about who will be held liable in the event of lost inventory. After a bust, arrested traffickers have been known to demand a receipt from authorities, so that they can prove the loss was not because of their own negligence which would mean they might have to pay for it or their own thievery which would mean they might have to die.
Some Colombian cartels have actually offered insurance policies on narcotics, as a safeguard against loss or seizure. To prevent catastrophic losses, cartels tend to distribute their risk as much as possible. Before sending a kilo shipment across the border, traffickers might disaggregate it into five carloads of 20 kilos each. Chapo and his associates further reduce their personal exposure by going in together on shipments, so each of those smaller carloads might hold 10 kilos belonging to Chapo and 10 belonging to Mayo Zambada.
The Sinaloa is occasionally called the Federation because senior figures and their subsidiaries operate semiautonomously while still employing a common smuggling apparatus.
The organizational structure of the cartel also seems fashioned to protect the leadership. No one knows how many people work for Sinaloa, and the range of estimates is comically broad.
Malcolm Beith, the author of a recent book about Chapo, posits that at any given moment, the drug lord may have , people working for him. John Bailey, a Georgetown professor who has studied the cartel, says that the number of actual employees could be as low as The way to account for this disparity is to distinguish between salaried employees and subcontractors. Even those who do work directly for the cartel are limited to carefully compartmentalized roles. But there was no sign of Chapo.
Once the discussion concluded, an emissary left the group and approached a Hummer that was parked in the distance and surrounded by men with bulletproof vests and machine guns, to report on the proceedings. Chapo never stepped out of the vehicle. The brutal opportunism of the underworld economy means that most partnerships are temporary, and treachery abounds.
To reduce the likelihood of clashes like these, the cartel has revived an unlikely custom: the ancient art of dynastic marriage. All of this intermarriage, one U. When the D. The cartel bribes mayors and prosecutors and governors, state police and federal police, the army, the navy and a host of senior officials at the national level.
With most of the facility on his payroll, he is said to have ordered his meals from a menu, conducted business by cellphone and orchestrated periodic visits by prostitutes, who would arrive aboard a prison truck driven by a guard.
I spoke with one drug producer who negotiated a joint venture deal with Chapo while he was behind bars. Eventually, as the story goes, Chapo was smuggled out in a laundry cart. The tacit but unwavering tolerance that Mexican authorities have shown for the drug trade over the years has muddled the boundaries between outlaws and officials. Daylight killings are sometimes carried out by men dressed in police uniforms, and it is not always clear, after the fact, whether the perpetrators were thugs masquerading as policemen or actual policemen providing paid assistance to the thugs.
On those occasions when the government scores a big arrest, meanwhile, police and military officials pose for photos at the valedictory news conference brandishing assault weapons, their faces shrouded in ski masks, to shield their identities.
In the trippy semiotics of the drug war, the cops dress like bandits, and the bandits dress like cops. Presumably, such gargantuan bribes to senior officials cascade down, securing the allegiance of their subordinates.
But in key jurisdictions, the cartel most likely makes payments up and down the chain of command. And then there are the Americans. Guards at the U. Paradoxically, one explanation for this state of affairs is the rapid expansion of border forces following the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. In their hurry to fortify the U.